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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal from 
the Second Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee, Woods Cross City (hereinafter "the City"), is 
dissatisfied with the statement of issues presented by Appellant, 
Craig Kirk (hereinafter "Kirk"), and submits the following 
statement of issues as permitted under Utah R. App. P. 24(b). 
Appellant's Statement of the Issues of Fact (a) through (c) are 
improper in that they presume the trial court referred 
specifically to property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross, Utah. In actuality, the trial court merely referred to 
property located "on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400 
West . . . ." (Judgment at f 1 (March 24, 1993)). 
I. Was the trial court correct in determining that there 
are no issues of material fact present in this case 
which would preclude summary judgment in the City's 
favor ? 
II. Was the trial court correct in determining that the 
undisputed facts entitle the City to judgment as a 
matter of law under Section 12-10-102 of the Woods 
Cross City Ordinances and Section 10-9-1002 of the Utah 
Code Annotated ? 
III. Was the trial court correct in dismissing Kirk's 
Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses ? 
IV. Do the new issues presented for the first time on 
appeal justify overturning the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in the City's favor ? 
V. Should the City be awarded damages, costs and attorneys 
fees under Utah R. App. P. 33 on the ground that Kirk's 
appeal is frivolous and pursued solely for the purpose 
of delay ? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
Court shall view the facts in a light most favorable to the 
losing party and shall review the trial court's conclusions of 
law for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shields v. State of Utah, 
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutes and rules that are pertinent to the resolution 
of the issues presented on appeal are set forth verbatim in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an action by Woods Cross 
seeking a permanent injunction against Craig Kirk enjoining the 
use of his property located within the City for commercial and/or 
industrial purposes in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning 
ordinances. Kirk is appealing the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in the City's favor. 
Course of Proceedings. Except as provided herein and as 
otherwise provided or supplemented in the City's Statement of 
Facts set forth belowf the City agrees with Kirk's Statement of 
the Course of Proceedings and will not duplicate such effort as 
permitted under Utah R. App. P. 24(b). The City disagrees with 
Kirk's Statement No. 2 in that the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed on December 2, 1992, not November 2, 1992, and 
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Statement No. 5 in that the City's Notice to Submit for Decision 
was filed on December 21, 1992, not December 2, 1992. The City 
further objects to Kirk's Statements No. 8 & 9 in that the trial 
court did entertain and rule on Kirk's Motion to Dismiss, Motions 
to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Stay Proceedings, as evidenced 
in the Judgment dated March 24, 1993. 
Disposition in Circuit Court. The Circuit Court, Honorable 
S. Mark Johnson presiding, granted Woods Cross' Motion for 
Summary Judgment permanently enjoining Kirk from using his 
property located at approximately 1450 West 500 South for parking 
and storing large commercial vehicles and equipment in violation 
of the Woods Cross zoning ordinances. 
Statement of Facts. Construing Woods Cross City's Complaint 
in a light most favorable to Kirk and indulging all reasonable 
inferences in Kirk's favor, the following facts appear of record: 
1. Appellee, Woods Cross City, is a municipal corporation 
and political subdivision of the State of Utah with its principal 
place of business being Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah 
(hereinafter "the City"). (Complaint at 5 1, Answer at f 1.) 
2. Appellant, Craig Kirk, is an individual and owner of 
property located within Woods Cross City, Utah (hereinafter 
"Kirk"). (Complaint at ! 2, Answer at 5 2.) 
3. Kirk owns certain property within Woods Cross located 
at approximately 1450 West 500 South (hereinafter "the 
Property"). (Complaint at 5 2, Answer at J 2.) 
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4. The Property is zoned A-l Agricultural under the Woods 
Cross City zoning ordinances, (Complaint at f 2, Answer at 1 2, 
Affidavit of Tim Stephens at 1.) 
5. Kirk is parking and storing large commercial and 
industrial trucks and equipment on the Property. (Affidavit of 
Tim Stephens at 2; Affidavit of Dero Gertsch; Affidavit of Leslie 
Gertsch; Affidavit of Brent Stephenson; and Affidavit of Gayle 
Stephenson.) 
6. The parking and storing of large commercial and 
industrial trucks and equipment is not a permitted use of the 
Property under the Woods Cross zoning ordinances. (Complaint; 
Affidavit of Tim Stephens at 2.) 
7. The City filed a Complaint against Kirk on August 4, 
1992, for his use of the Property in violation of City 
ordinances. (Complaint.) 
8. The City's Complaint requested judgment and permanent 
injunction enjoining Kirk from using the Property for commercial 
and/or industrial purposes including but not limited to its use 
for storing or maintaining commercial vehicles. (Complaint at f 
9. The City's Complaint described the property at issue as 
that located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross 
City, Utah." (Complaint at 1 2.) 
10. Kirk's agent, R.L. Hansen of B & C Building Company, 
described the Property as that located at "1450 West 500 South" 
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in applying for a building permit from the City to construct a 
"barn" on said Property. (Complaint at 1 4•) 
11. The City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support thereof on December 2, 1992. (Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support.) 
12. Kirk filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Dero 
Gertsch, Leslie Gertsch, Tim Stephensf Brent Stephenson, and 
Gayle Stephenson, which were submitted in support of the City/s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, on December 8, 1992. (Motions to 
Strike Affidavits.) 
13. Kirk filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 18, 1992. 
(Motion to Dismiss.) 
14. Kirk filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on January 14, 
1993. (Motion to Stay.) 
15. The City/s Motion for Summary Judgment, Kirk's Motion 
to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and Motion to Stay 
Proceeding were heard before the Honorable S. Mark Johnson on 
February 11, 1993, at 10:30 a.m. Both parties were represented 
by respective counsel. (Judgment at p. 1.) 
16. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and 
Kirk's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and 
Motion to Stay Proceedings were denied by the Court on March 9, 
1993, and Judgment was entered on March 24, 1993 (hereinafter 
"the Judgment"). (Judgment at p. 2.) 
17. Kirk filed a Notice of Appeal of the Judgment with the 
Utah Court of Appeals on the April 23, 1993. (Notice of Appeal.) 
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18. The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Notice of 
Appeal from Kirk. (Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes and Kristi L. 
Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition.) 
19. Kirk filed a Docketing Statement with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on June 3, 1993. (Docketing Statement.) 
20. The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Docketing 
Statement from Kirk. (Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes and Kristi 
L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition.) 
21. Kirk filed a Statement Regarding Transcript with the 
Utah Court of Appeals on July 25f 1993. (Statement Regarding 
Transcript.) 
22. The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Statement 
Regarding Transcript from Kirk. (Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes 
and Kristi L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition.) 
23. Kirk filed an Amended Docketing Statement on August 25, 
1993. (Amended Docketing Statement.) 
24. The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Amended 
Docketing Statement from Kirk. (Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes 
and Kristi L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition.) 
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25. Kirk filed an Application for Re-Zone of his Property 
with the City sometime in November of 1992. The document is 
dated October 13, 1992. (City's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Kirk's Motion to Stay Appeal Proceedings at I 4.) 
26. The Woods Cross City Council denied Kirk's Application 
for Re-Zone. (City's Memorandum in Opposition to Kirk's Motion 
to Stay Appeal Proceedings at 1 5.) 
27. Kirk filed an appeal of the City Council's denial of 
his Application for Re-Zone with the Second District Court on 
March 23, 1993. (City's Memorandum in Opposition to Kirk's 
Motion to Stay Appeal Proceedings at f 6.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in granting the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Kirk in that there exist no issues 
of material fact and the City is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The material facts in this case are that Kirk owns 
property within Woods Cross City located at approximately 1450 
West 500 South; Kirk is using such property to park and store 
large commercial trucks and equipment; the property is zoned A-1, 
which zone does not permit the parking or storing of large 
commercial trucks and equipment. Injunctive relief for violation 
of City zoning ordinances is proper in this case as a matter of 
law under Section 12-10-102 of the Woods Cross City Ordinances 
and Section 10-9-1002 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
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Kirk failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the 
issues raised in his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses and 
the trial court was correct in dismissing the same. 
Kirk may not raise for the first time on appeal the argument 
that he did not have adequate opportunity for discovery prior to 
summary judgment. This argument is meritless anyway and should 
not preclude summary judgment in the City's favor. 
The trial court did address and rule on Kirk's Motion to 
Dismiss, Motion to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Stay 
Proceedings. Kirk's argument that these items were not 
entertained by the Court is specious and does not preclude 
summary judgment in the City's favor. 
Finally, Kirk's appeal is based upon frivolous arguments and 
is pursued for purposes of delay and in bad faith. Pursuant to 
Utah R. App. P. 33, the City should be awarded damages, double 
costs and attorneys fees incurred as a result of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CITY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST KIRK AS THERE EXIST 
NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THERE EXIST NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. Kirk owns 
property located at approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross, Utah, hereinafter referred to as "the Property." The 
Property is zoned Agricultural A-1 under the Revised Ordinances 
of Woods Cross, Utah. Kirk built a structure on the Property 
pursuant to a Building Permit obtained from the City wherein 
wc-kirlubrf Q 
Kirk's agent described the structure as a "barn" and listed the 
location of the Property as "1450 West 500 South," Woods Cross. 
Kirk is using the Property and the "barn" to park large asphalt 
paving trucks and equipment used in his patching and paving 
business. 
Kirk does not contest the fact that the Property is zoned A-
1 or that it is being used in violation of the Woods Cross City 
zoning ordinances. Kirk's appeal is based solely on the 
contention that Kirk "is not the owner of the property located at 
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah . . . " and therefore 
has never conducted any business on that property or ever parked 
any vehicles on that property. Appellant's Brief at p. 15. 
Kirk's argument is specious, non-meritorious and frivolous. 
As the City discussed in its Motion for Summary Disposition, 
there is no issue of fact regarding the location of the property 
involved in this case. Kirk owns some property in the area of 
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, which is zoned A-l and 
which Kirk is using to park and store large commercial vehicles 
and equipment. No address has been given to the property, so the 
parties have been referring to the property as merely that 
located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, 
Utah." Even Kirk used this reference to his property when 
applying for a building permit with the City. Kirk now claims 
that the property he owns is "1473 West 500 South, Woods Cross 
City, Utah." This contention is based upon a random assignment 
of numbering from Utah Power & Light as noted in Kirk's bill from 
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the Company. Despite Kirk's argument, only the City can assign 
an address to a property (see Affidavit of Scott Anderson 
attached to the City's Reply to Kirk's Memorandum in Opposition 
to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment). As testified to in 
the Affidavit of Scott Anderson, the Public Works Director of 
Woods Cross City, no address has been assigned to the Property. 
(Affidavit of Scott Anderson at 1 3.) Thus, referring to the 
Property as that located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South" 
is sufficiently clear for purposes of this case. Regardless, the 
Judgment of the Circuit Court does not specifically refer to 
"1450 West 500 South" anyway, but merely refers to "property 
which is located on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400 
West . . . ." (Judgment at f 1 (March 24, 1993). 
Furthermore, the trial court addressed Kirk's "incorrect 
address" argument which was raised in both Kirk's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Kirk's Motion to Dismiss. The trial court found as a matter of 
fact that the Property at issue was properly identified. At the 
oral argument before the trial court, Judge Johnson specifically 
asked Kirk's attorney if Kirk owned property in the area to which 
the pleading referred. Kirk's attorney answered in the 
affirmative. Judge Johnson further explained that he did not 
want there to be any misunderstanding or issue regarding the 
property the parties were talking about. Kirk's attorney agreed, 
thereby consenting to the fact that he knows what property the 
case involves, that such property is zoned A-l, and that the 
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Property is being used for parking and storing of large 
commercial vehicles and equipment. 
These conclusions are not disputed by any evidence submitted 
by Kirk. Kirk contends that the Affidavit he filed in opposition 
to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment "created a genuine 
issue of material fact in this case." Kirk's Brief at 16. While 
it is conceded in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), that "[o]ne sworn statement 
under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, 
thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment," the court also 
noted that "when the moving party has presented evidence 
sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing 
party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is 
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present 
or would be at trial." Arnica, 768 P.2d at 953 (citation 
omitted). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
affidavits in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment must 
contain specific evidentiary facts that would be admissible in 
evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Treloqqan 
v. Treloqqan. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).* Kirk's Affidavit fails 
to meet the required standard as it presents no specific evidence 
contrary to the facts establishing that Kirk owns property at 
approximately 1450 West 500 South which Kirk is using in 
1
 See also, Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) which states that 
"[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to matters stated therein." 
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violation of Woods Cross City zoning ordinances. Wherefore, the 
trial court was justified in concluding that no genuine issue of 
fact is present or would be at trial. 
Kirk contends that there exists an issue of material fact 
regarding the City's allegation that Kirk is using his property 
for conducting a business without a license. Much of this claim 
is based upon Kirk's specious argument that he does not own the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South in Woods Cross, and 
therefore is not responsible for what takes place on such 
property. Kirk's Affidavit merely says that he is not conducting 
a business, or storing vehicles or using a phone on property 
located at 1450 West 500 South because he does not own such 
property. Kirk's Affidavit does not and cannot say that he has 
not built a structure on property located in the vicinity of 1450 
West 500 South or that he is not parking and storing large 
commercial vehicles. As noted above, the property referenced in 
the pleading notes "approximately 1450 West 500 South in Woods 
Cross." Kirk knows what property this case involves and has 
failed to controvert any fact or create an issue of material fact 
regarding his use of the Property for conducting a business 
without a license and in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning 
ordinances. 
In addition, regardless of whether there is enough evidence 
to support summary judgment on Kirk's use of his property without 
a business license, summary judgment is appropriate in this case. 
Summary judgment may be granted upon any number of established 
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violations of the Woods Cross City zoning ordinances. Thus, the 
trial court need not have found as a matter of fact or law that 
Kirk was conducting business without a license, since it found as 
a matter of fact and law that he was parking and storing large 
commercial vehicles and equipment on the Property in violation of 
the zoning ordinances entitling the City to injunctive relief. 
B. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
Woods Cross zoning ordinances provide as a matter of law that 
land zoned for Agricultural A-l may be used for: 
(A) agriculture; 
(B) single family dwelling; 
(C) horticulture; 
(D) accessory uses including: 
(1) accessory buildings which are customarily used in 
conjunction withf and incidental to, the principal 
use or structure; 
(2) swimming pools; 
(3) home occupations; 
(4) household pets; 
(5) storage of materials used for construction of a 
building; 
Section 12-10-102 of the Revised Ordinances of Woods Cross, Utah, 
1992. Kirk,s use of the Property to park and store paving trucks 
and equipment is use of the Property for industrial and/or 
commercial purposes. Such use is not permitted under Section 12-
10-102, and is therefore in violation of the Woods Cross zoning 
ordinances as a matter of law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 
(1992), the City is entitled to obtain an injunction prohibiting 
Kirk's further industrial and/or commercial use of the Property. 
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Furthermore, the City "need only establish the violation [of the 
ordinance] to obtain the injunction." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1002(1)(b) (1992). A specific showing of irreparable injury is 
not required in an action by the City to enjoin a violation of 
its zoning ordinances as "a showing that the zoning ordinance has 
been violated is tantamount to a showing of irreparable injury . 
. . ." Utah County v. Baxter. 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981). A 
specific showing of damages is also not required. Harris v. 
Sprinoville City, 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984). Under the applicable 
laws, ordinances and undisputed facts, the City is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law and the trial court's finding 
should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CITY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE DISMISSAL OF 
KIRK'S COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
Kirk has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies 
regarding the issues raised in his Counterclaim and affirmative 
defenses and therefore the trial court properly granted the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding such claims. It is 
well-established law that failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies prevents one from seeking relief from the courts. 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court noted in Merrihew: " [w]e do not reach the 
issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance because we hold 
that the Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
prevents him from seeking relief at this time from the courts." 
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Merrihew, 659 P.2d at 1067. The Utah Legislature has also 
recognized the importance of exhausting administrative remedies 
in the area of local land use and planning. Section 10-9-1001(1) 
of the Utah Code Annotated provides: 
No person may challenge in district court a 
municipality's land use decisions made under this 
chapter or under the regulation made under authority of 
this chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1) (1992). 
In essence, Kirk's Counterclaim and affirmative defenses 
request the court to re-zone the Property from A-l to 1-1 or to 
grant a non-conforming use permit to allow Kirk to use the 
Property to store and park large commercial vehicles and 
equipment. It would have been improper for the trial court to 
entertain such a request as there exists administrative 
procedures and remedies for Kirk to exhaust prior to raising such 
claims before the court. Under Woods Cross City ordinances and 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, et seq., Kirk should have filed an 
application for re-zone or for a non-conforming use permit with 
the City Planning Commission setting forth all the reasons why 
the Property should be re-zoned. The decision of the Planning 
Commission, if adverse to Kirk, could then be appealed to the 
City Council. The City Council's decision, if adverse to Kirk 
could then be appealed to the District Court. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001 (1992). 
Subsequent to this action by the City against Kirk, Kirk 
filed an application for re-zone of his Property from A-l to 1-1 
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with the City Planning Commission. The City Council ultimately 
denied Kirk's re-zone request and Kirk filed an appeal of that 
decision with the Second District Court. The appeal to the 
Second District Court is in its discovery stage. The application 
for re-zone and appeal in the Second District Court is the 
correct procedure for determining the issues raised in Kirk's 
Counterclaim. They should not be entertained by this Court in 
conjunction with the present case regarding Kirk's violations of 
existing Woods Cross zoning ordinances. 
If Kirk's argument is taken to its logical extreme, any 
person could entirely circumvent the City's re-zone and permit 
application process. Under Kirk's argument, rather than 
requesting a property re-zone or conditional use permit from the 
local government, a property owner could simply use his or her 
property in violation of local ordinances, and when the local 
government brought an action for violation of its ordinances, the 
property owner could counterclaim asking the court to re-zone the 
property. This is not allowed, however, as the Utah Legislature 
has specifically delegated land use and zoning decisions to local 
authorities not the courts. In addition, the administrative 
remedies of the local jurisdiction must be exhausted prior to 
seeking relief from the courts. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1) 
(1992). Kirk's argument also incorrectly implies that a person 
may violate current city ordinances if an application for re-zone 
has been filed with the city or if a challenge has been made to 
the applicable ordinance. Once again, this is not the case as 
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property owners must comply with current law until and unless 
otherwise permitted by re-zone, conditional use permit or 
judicial determination. 
Kirk's use of his Property in violation of the Woods Cross 
zoning ordinances is not exempted simply because he has filed for 
a re-zone with the City. Nor is it for this Court or the trial 
court to determine whether such re-zone should be granted, absent 
exhaustion of administrative remedies already provided by state 
and local law.2 Finally, despite Kirk's argument, an "attempt" 
to exhaust administrative remedies is not sufficient to qualify 
as exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
III. THE NEW ISSUES PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
DO NOT JUSTIFY OVERTURNING THE TRIAL COURT7S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE CITY'S FAVOR. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROHIBITED IN THIS CASE BY 
KIRK'S ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY 
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY. 
Summary Judgment in the City's favor should not be 
overturned on the grounds that Kirk did not have adequate 
opportunity to conduct discovery. First, Kirk raises this issue 
for the first time on appeal. It is well-established law that 
issues not raised below may not be addressed for the first time 
2
 See Provo City v. Claudin, 63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936), 
discussed in the City's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 11, wherein the 
Utah Supreme Court declined to hear the Claudin's substantive 
argument regarding the constitutionality of Provo's zoning 
ordinance as applied to the Claudin's since the Claudin's had 
failed to first exhaust administrative remedies provided under 
Provo ordinances. 
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on appeal. Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah 1993). In 
Smith, the Utah Supreme Court declined to consider an argument 
which was not adequately framed in the pleadings nor adequately 
raised in the summary judgment motion or supporting memorandum, 
and noted "it is fundamental that the trial court should have the 
first opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal." 
Smith. 848 P.2d at 677 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Rule 
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment may submit an affidavit 
stating the reasons why he or she needs more opportunity for 
discovery prior to entry of summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(f). Kirk failed to raise the issue of "adequate discovery" in 
his Memorandum in Opposition to the City,s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, at oral argument before the trial court, under a Rule 
56(f) Motion, or in any other pleadings submitted to the Court. 
The issue may not now be raised or considered by the Court for 
the first time on appeal. 
In addition to improper timing, Kirk's "lack of adequate 
discovery" argument is meritless. While it is true that summary 
judgment may not be appropriate if discovery is incomplete, the 
parties and the court need not go on a fishing expedition for 
purely speculative or irrelevant facts. Downtown Athletic Club 
v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). As noted in 
Downtown Athletic, "a court should deny a motion to continue if 
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without 
merit." Downtown Athletics, 740 P.2d at 276. In the case at 
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hand, the material facts have been properly established, they are 
not in dispute, and the City is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law based on such facts. Further discovery in this case would 
not add anything to these material facts, and would only be 
dilatory or without merit. Thus, summary judgment in the City's 
favor is proper. 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROHIBITED IN THIS CASE BY 
KIRK'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
RULE ON KIRK'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS. 
Summary Judgment in the City's favor should not be 
overturned on the grounds that the trial court failed to rule on 
Kirk's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Affidavits. Of all 
of Kirk's arguments, this is perhaps the most ridiculous. Both 
parties fully addressed these motions through Memorandum 
submitted in support and opposition of the same as well as at 
oral argument. More importantly, the trial court addressed these 
arguments and ruled on them in conjunction with granting the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Judgment dated March 24, 
1993, states on page 1: "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, 
and Motions to Stay Proceedings came on before the Honorable S. 
Mark Johnson on Thursday, the 11th day of February 1993 . . . ." 
The Judgment then ordered, adjudged and decreed that "Defendant's 
counterclaim in its entirety is dismissed" and "Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and Motion to 
Stay Proceedings are denied." Judgment at If 4 & 5 (March 24, 
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1993). Thus, there is no merit to Kirk's argument that these 
Motions need to be heard when in fact they have already been 
heard and adjudicated upon by the trial court. 
IV. THE CITY SHOULD BE GRANTED DAMAGES, COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THE APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND PURSUED SOLELY FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF DELAY. 
Kirk's appeal in this case is not only non-meritorious, but 
also frivolous and in bad faith. Pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the City is entitled to just damages, double 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred as a result of such 
frivolous appeal. Rule 33 provides: 
If the court shall determine that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages and single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing 
party. 
Utah R. App. P. 33. 
A frivolous appeal has been defined as "[o]ne in which no 
justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily 
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect 
that it can ever succeed." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 
(Utah 1990) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979)). 
Rule 33, as amended in 1990, also provides that for purposes of 
the Appellate Rules, "a frivolous appeal . . . is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. M 
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Kirk's appeal is frivolous under both these standards as it 
is based solely on the argument of a wrong address. Kirk claims 
he does not own property located at 1450 West 500 South in Woods 
Cross, and therefore is not responsible or liable for any 
wrongdoing on such property. However, the Judgment does not 
refer specifically to the Property as located at 1450 West 500 
South, but describes the Property owned by Kirk in that general 
area. More importantly, the parties know the property this case 
involves.3 To argue otherwise is in bad faith. Finally, Kirk's 
pursuit of this appeal is mainly a delay tactic in order to 
permit Kirk to continue to violate the ordinances of Woods Cross. 
Since Kirk's Motion to Stay the injunction was granted, Kirk is 
using the Property in violation of the Woods Cross zoning 
ordinances and the City has no way to prevent such use pending 
this appeal. It is therefore in Kirk's best interest to continue 
the judicial process regardless of its merit in order to avoid 
enforcement of the injunction preventing Kirk's improper use of 
the Property. 
In awarding damages under this Rule, the Supreme Court noted 
in Hunt, that "[w]e do not believe or intend that the litigation 
of new or uncertain issues will be chilled by imposing sanctions 
on attorneys who pursue what in reality are nuisance claims and 
do so in an unlawyer-like fashion by writing an unprofessional 
3
 As previously discussed, the trial judge specifically 
questioned Kirk's attorney about this issue at the oral argument 
held on February 11, 1993. It was conceded at that time that the 
parties understood the property involved in the case. 
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brief and relying on improper materials and arguments in the 
brief." Hunt, 785 P.2d at 415. In the case at hand, Kirk's 
filing and notice practice (i.e. failure to send opposing counsel 
a copy of any pleading filed with the Court of Appeals except the 
Brief, which was itself seven days late), and the frivolous basis 
for its appeal, fall squarely within the sanctions permitted 
under Rule 33. Wherefore, the City respectfully requests this 
Court for just damages, double costs and attorney's fees incurred 
by the City in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
a light most favorable to Kirk, it is clear that there exists no 
issue of material fact regarding the location of the property at 
issue in this case, that such property is zoned A-l under the 
Woods Cross Ordinances and that Kirk is parking and storing large 
commercial vehicles and equipment on such Property. 
The major purpose of summary judgment is "to avoid 
unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings 
to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present the fact 
finder." Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 
776 (Utah 1984). In circumstances where the grant is justified, 
it serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble 
and expense of trial which would be to no avail anyway. McBride 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1980). The trial court 
correctly determined that a trial would be to no avail in this 
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case and properly granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
thereby serving the salutary purpose of eliminating any 
unnecessary time, trouble and expense to the parties and the 
courts. 
The City respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
judgment of the trial court dated March 24, 1993, granting the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Kirk's 
Counterclaim and Motions. The City further requests an award of 
damages, costs and attorney's fees the Court deems appropriate 
for defense of this frivolous appeal. 
DATED this day of June, 1994. 
Kisa G. Romney ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of Junef 1994, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE was mailed first class mail, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Charles A. Schultz 
P.O. Box 1516 
Sandy, Utah 84103 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES: 
Woods Cross Ordinance § 12-10-101 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1992) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
Utah R. App. P. 33 
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CHAPTER 12-10 AGRICULTURE ZONE A-l 
12-10-101 Purpose 
12-10-102 Permitted Uses 
12-10-103 Conditional Uses 
12-10-104 Minimum Lot Standards 
12-10-105 Maximum Building Height 
12-10-106 Off-street Parking, Loading, and Access 
12-10-107 Signs 
12-10-108 Site Plan Review 
12-10-109 Fencing 
12-10-101 Purpose 
The Agriculture Zone A-l is established to provide areas in 
which agricultural pursuits can be encouraged and supported within 
Woods Cross • The A-l Zone is designed and intended to protect 
agriculture uses from encroachment of urban development until such 
time as residential, commercial, or industrial uses in such areas 
become necessary and desirable. Conversion of the agriculture zone 
to zones allowing urban uses should be accomplished in an orderly 
and progressive manner with no "leap frog" encroachments of such 
uses or development into agriculture areas. 
12-10-102 Permitted Uses 
(A) Agriculture 
(B) Single Family Dwelling 
(C) Horticulture 
(D) Accessory Uses: 
Accessory uses and structures are permitted in the A-l 
Zone, provided they are incidental to, and do not 
substantially alter the character of, the permitted 
principal use or structure. Such permitted accessory 
uses include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Accessory buildings such as garages, carports, 
bathhouses, greenhouses, gardening sheds, barns, 
recreation rooms, and similar structures which are 
customarily used in conjunction with, and 
incidental to, the principal use or structure. 
(2) Swimming Pools 
(3) Home Occupations subject to the regulations of 
Chapter 27 of this Title. 
(4) Household Pets 
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(5) Storage of Material used for construction of a 
building, including contractors temporary office, 
provided that such use is on the building site or 
immediately adjacent thereto, and provided further 
that such use will be permitted only while 
construction is actually in progress and 30 days 
thereafter, 
12-10-103 Conditional Uses 
(A) Public Uses 
(B) Quasi-Public Uses 
(C) Grazing and Pasturing 
(D) Agricultural Industry 
12-10-104 Minimum Lot Standards 
All lots shall be developed and all structures and uses shall 
be placed in accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
Lot Size: 
Lot Width: 
Front & Rear Yard: 
Side Yard: 
1 acre 
100 feet 
30 feet 
8 feet 
(E) Side Yard Corner: 
(F) Accessory Buildings: 
id a total width of 
the two required side yards of 
18 feet; main buildings only. 
20 feet for all buildings on 
the side adjacent to the 
street. 
Accessory Building shall be 6 
feet or more in the rear of the 
main building and at least 1 
foot from all property lines; 
and shall be 15 feet from 
dwellings on adjacent lots. 
(Accessory buildings shall not 
be built over utility easements 
that may run along side and 
rear property lines.) 
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MUNICIPAL LAND USE 10-9-1002 
energy devices based on renewable resources from being installed on build-
ings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 52. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
PART 10 
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
10-9-1001. Appeals-
CD No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under au-
thority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of 
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision 
with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, made grammat-
ical changes in Subsection (1) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Plan-
Planning § 1019 et seq ning § 265 et seq 
10-9-1002. Enforcement. 
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality 
in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the au-
thority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to 
other remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the in-
junction. 
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding build-
ing permits. 
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the 
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without 
approval of a building permit. 
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10-9-1003 CITIES AND TOWNS 
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans 
of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, 
or use fully conform to all regulations then in effect. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1002, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 54. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Laches as defense in suit by gov-
ernmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73 
A.L.R.4th 870. 
10-9-1003. Penalties. 
(1) The municipal legislative body may, by ordinance, establish civil penal-
ties for violations of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances 
adopted under the authority of this chapter. 
(2) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances 
adopted under the authority of this chapter are punishable as a class C misde-
meanor upon conviction either: 
(a) as a class C misdemeanor; or 
(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted under the author-
ity of this section. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1003, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 55; 1992, ch. 23, § 24. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added Subsection meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
(1), designated Subsection (2), and added "ei-
ther" to precede new Subsections (2)(a) and 
(2Kb). 
CHAPTER 10 
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS 
(Repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 24, § 2; 1977, ch. 
48, § 1; 1979, ch. 31, § 1; 
1988, ch. 169, § 66.) 
10-10-1 to 10-10-75. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 169, § 66 repeals vice commission, were repealed by § 10-1-114, 
§ 10-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 48, § 1. For present 
to division of city into wards, effective April 25, provisions, see § 10-3-1001 et seq. 
1988. Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75 (L. 1961, ch. 
Sections 10-10-2 to 10-10-8 (Utah Code An- 24, § 1; 1967, ch. 24, § 1; 1971, ch. 14, § 1; 
notated 1953; L. 1957, ch. 20, § 1), relating to
 1 9 7 2 ( i s t S.S.), ch. 1, §§ 1 to 12; 1973 (1st S.S.), 
budget system, were repealed by Laws 1961,
 c h 1? § 1)f t h e U n i f o r m Mumcipal Fiscal Pro-
d i - 2 4 ! ^ * „^
 n .^ ,^ rtrt ,TT , ^ , * cedures Act, were repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 
Sections 10-10-9 to 10-10-22 (Utah Code An-
 Q1 R , Vnr.'cor,f JZM* 0 ^ &s m Aim 
4. 4. j i n c o T mco v. on * i mnc u ic 31, § 1. ror present provisions, see §§ 10-6-101 
notated 1953; L. 1953, ch. 20, § 1; 1955, ch. 16, . 10-6-159 
§ 1; 1955, ch. 17, § 1), relating to the civil ser-562 
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scheduled appearance in another court on that from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
date, but due to fact that there were no law or ment, rather than from the date of judgment, 
motion days between time objection was filed Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered & Trust Co. v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v. Ham- C i t e d m U t a h S a n d & G r a v e l ^ods- C o r P v 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965), 
Time for appeal. J P W ' E n t e r s > I n c v- N a e f ' 6 0 4 R 2 d 4 8 6 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal < U t a h 1979>; K a t z v P i e r c e> 7 3 2 P 2 d 9 2 < U t a h 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
1152 to 1213. 1255. 
C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 F
, f Urf to P™ «**«* ° f ^ c a t i o n for de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- [a u l t J ^ ^ f^™™^" r e q u i r e d o n l y 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d ^ c u s t°m, 28 A.L.K.dd ISM. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Notice. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Enckson, 802 P.2d 111 
(Utah Ct. App 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and ment creditor appealing unsuccessfully on 
Error § 941. grounds of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 995. Running of interest on judgment where both 
A r n T^x.r i_ • i_ • * ^ J parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
A L.R. - Date from which interest on judg- ^
 t l v e h c a t l o n a n d e f f e c t o f s t a t e 
ment starts running, as affected by modifica-
 s t a t u t e o r m l e a l l o w i n g m t e r e 8 t o r c h a n g i n g 
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees-
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is must award damages. This is in keeping with 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de- However, the amount of damages — single or 
lays and frivolous appeals. double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
